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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal involving category one statutory employer immunity pursuant to the

exclusive remedy rule of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law. Idaho Code§ 72-101 et seq.
The appeal involves a contract under which Appellant Dale Kelly was "hired" to deliver steel
tubing to Respondent TRC Fabrication, LLC's ("TRC's") facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The
prime contract for the purchase of the steel tubing was between TRC and Brown Strauss Steel
Co. ("Brown Strauss") in California. R., p. 10. The prime contract between TRC and Brown
Strauss contained a provision indicating that the shipment of the steel tubing was "F.O.B.
Delivered[.]" R., p. 118. In other words, delivery of the metal tubing by the seller, Brown
Strauss, was a material aspect of the bargain struck between TRC and Brown Strauss, and as the
district court correctly found, was "a service for which TRC contracted." R., p. 207.
To comply with the "F.O.B. Delivered" term of the prime contract between TRC and
Brown Strauss, Brown Strauss elected to subcontract out its delivery obligation to Jay Transport.
R., p. 56.

In turn, Jay Transport engaged Dale Kelly to transport and deliver the shipment to

TRC in Idaho Falls. R., p. 10, pp. 79-80. While assisting in the unloading of the steel tubing at
TRC's facility in Idaho Falls, Dale Kelly was struck by steel tubing and sustained personal
injuries. R., p. 11.
As a result of those injuries, Dale Kelly sought and received worker's compensation
benefits under a policy in the name of Dale Kelly's assumed business name, "Dale Kelly
Trucking." R., at p. 49, p. 199. Kelly and his wife, Nancy Kelly, (collectively, the "Kellys") also

filed a complaint against TRC for damages resulting from TRC's alleged negligence. R., pp. 915. Kelly sought recovery of damages under a negligence theory. R., pp. 12-13. Nancy Kelly
sought recovery under a derivative claim for loss of consortium arising out of Dale Kelly's
injuries. R., pp. 13-14. To avoid double recovery by Dale Kelly of both workers' compensation
benefits and civil money damages, Judge Watkins granted TRC summary judgment, finding that
because Kelly was "hired" to transport and deliver the steel tubes TRC purchased from Brown
Strauss, TRC was entitled to category one statutory employer immunity under the Idaho
Worker's Compensation Law. R., p. 208.

The district court also granted TRC summary

judgment as to Nancy Kelly's wholly-derivative loss of consortium claim. R., p. 209-10.
In this appeal, just as the Kellys did at the district court level, the Kellys seeks to inject
concepts from the UCC Article 2 sale of goods context into an analysis of statutes in the Idaho
Worker's Compensation Law. Aside from a recent decision from Judge Candy Dale (a case in
which appellant's counsel's firm was the architect of such decision), the Kellys come forward
with no authority from any jurisdiction employing a UCC Article 2 analysis in the context of
interpreting a state's workers' compensation act. As the district court correctly held, the relevant
question under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law is not whether a particular contract in the
applicable chain is for "goods" or "services" (or has as its predominant purpose "goods" or
"services") under UCC Article 2. Instead, the appropriate statutory inquiry is whether under
Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a), the services of a worker have been "hired" by an upstream
contractor. R., p. 204. The district court correctly ruled here that Kelly had been "hired" to
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transport and deliver the steel tubes, and therefore, that TRC was entitled to category one
statutory employer immunity. R., pp. 207-08. The district court should therefore be affirmed.

B.

Course of Proceedings
The relevant proceedings for purposes of this appeal are those related to the category one

statutory employer argument raised in the summary judgment motion filed by TRC, as it was on
that ground that the district court granted summary judgment. On October 16, 2019, TRC filed
its motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims asserted by the Kellys on the
grounds that TRC was a statutory employer of Dale Kelly, and therefore, that TRC was entitled
to immunity under the exclusive remedy rule of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law. R., pp.
30-43. The Kellys responded -- arguing as they do here -- that the district court should import
the goods/services concepts from Article 2 of the UCC to the worker's compensation context and
find that the prime contract between TRC and Brown Strauss was for goods and not services, and
that therefore, the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law should not be deemed to apply. R., pp 88103.
The district court rejected the Kellys' invitation to apply UCC Article 2 concepts in
interpreting and applying the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. R., p. 204. Instead, in its
Memorandum Decisio·n and Order dated December 3, 2019, the district court interpreted the
plain language of Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) and found that because Kelly had been "hired" by
TRC to transport and deliver the steel tubes from Brown Strauss in Fontana, California to TRC
in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that TRC was Dale Kelly's statutory employer and entitled to category
one statutory employer immunity. R., pp. 207-08.
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The district court subsequently entered

judgment in TRC's favor as to all claims raised by the Kellys on December 12, 2019 (the
"Judgment"). R., p. 212-13. The Kellys timely appealed the Judgment on December 17, 2019.

R., p. 214-216.

C.

Statement of Facts
In January 2018, TRC purchased more than 43,000 pounds of metal tubing from Brown

Strauss in Fontana, California. R., pp. 82-83. The contract between TRC and Brown Strauss
contained the term "F.O.B. Delivered." R., p. 118. To comply with the "F.O.B. Delivered" term
of the contract, Brown Strauss contracted with Jay Transport to haul the metal tubing from
Fontana, California to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls. R., p. 56. In January 2018, Dale Kelly was
operating under the d/b/a of "Dale Kelly Trucking." R., pp. 48-49. Dale Kelly Trucking was an
exclusive contractor for Jay Transport, which provided him with all of his work assignments. R.,
pp. 48-49.

Pursuant to the exclusive contract with Jay Transport, Dale Kelly Trucking was

required to and did obtain various types of insurance coverage, including workers compensation
coverage. R., pp. 48-49. Worker's compensation coverage for Dale Kelly Trucking was paid by
Dale Kelly Trucking company funds. R., pp. 48-49.
Jay Transport assigned Dale Kelly Trucking to transport the shipment of metal tubing
from Brown Strauss to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho. R., p. I 0, pp. 79-80. While the
tubing was being unloaded at TRC' s facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho, the load fell, hit the ground,
and rolled into Dale Kelly's leg. R., p. 11. Through the workers compensation coverage obtained
by his d/b/a Dale Kelly Trucking, Dale Kelly applied for and received workers compensation
benefits (wage, medical, and disability) for the injuries he sustained. R., at p. 49, p. 199.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

TRC agrees that Kelly has adequately described the issues before the Court on appeal.
That said, the Kellys misstate the applicable law in their phrasing of the first issue on appeal.
The applicable question under the Worker's Compensation Law is not whether a contract is
characterized as one predominantly for "goods" or for "services," but instead, whether a
worker's services were "hired" as a result of said contract.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

Statutory Employer Immunity under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law,

As is well-known to this Court, the Legislature removed-with few exceptions-all
workplace injuries from "private controversy." LC. § 72-201. To that end, the Legislature
crafted a system whereby "sure and certain relief' would be provided to injured workers
regardless of fault. Id This "sure and certain relief' is provided "to the exclusion of every other'
remedy, proceeding, or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in the worker's
compensation scheme." Id; see also I.C, § 72-209(1); J.C.§ 72-211.
The exception is found at LC. § 72-223, which allows an injured worker to sue a socalled "third party" who may be liable for damages stemming from the injury. LC. § 72-223(1),
(2). However, individuals or entities that meet the statutory definition of employer (so-called
"statutory employers") are not "third parties" within the meaning of LC. § 72-223, and,
therefore, are immune from suit just like a claimant's direct employer. Idaho Code § 72102(13)(a) describes two categories of statutory employers - category one statutory employers
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(contractors and subcontractors of a claimant's direct employer) and category two statutory
employers (the virtual proprietor of the premises):
"Employer" means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted
the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes
the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor
or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being
an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of
the workers there employed. It also includes, for purposes of section 72-438(12)
and (14), Idaho Code, a municipality, village, county or fire district that utilizes
the services of volunteer firefighters. If the employer is secured, it means his
surety so far as applicable.
Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) (emphasis added).
At issue on this appeal is category one statutory employer immunity. The relevant
portion of § 72-102(13)(a) defines a category one "employer" as "any person who has
expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the services of another.

It includes

contractors and subcontractors." (Emphasis added). Idaho law is clear that, in the event

that a direct employer does not provide worker's compensation benefits to an injured
employee, al1 of the direct employer's upstream contractors may be liable for the payment of
those benefits. See Idaho Code § 72-216(1); Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 203 P.3d 1246
(2009) (contractor that expressly contracts the services of a subcontractor is liable for workers'
compensation benefits if the subcontractor does not provide them).
In exchange for the imposition of this potential liability, all of the upstream
contractors are also entitled to "stand in the shoes" of the direct employer and claim complete
immunity from any legal claim brought by the injured employee in the event workers'
compensation benefits are actually paid by the direct employer and/or another contractor
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higher up in the contractual chain. Idaho Code § 72-216(2), 72-223; Blake, 146 Idaho at 847
(holding that upstream contractor that is liable for workers' compensation benefits is a
statutory employer entitled to employer immunity). This is known as the "Grand Bargain."
With this framework in mind, the Court now considers whether the district court
properly concluded that TRC is entitled to category one statutory employer immunity. For the
reasons more fully set forth below, TRC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
Judgment of the district court.
B.

The district court properly concluded that TRC "hired" the services of Dale Kelly,
and therefore, properly concluded that the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law is
applicable to this case.

The Kellys first contend, as they did below, that the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law
is inapplicable to this case, because the prime contract between Brown Strauss and TRC was
predominantly for "goods" as opposed to "services."

However, the Kellys modify their

arguments on appeal to emphasize the "F.O.B. Delivered" term of the contract between Brown
Strauss and TRC, arguing that because the contract between Brown Strauss and TRC was
"F.O.B. Delivered," "TRC did not itself contract directly for shipping ... [and] [u]nder the terms
of the Purchase Agreement and Invoice No. 803034, TRC was only purchasing goods - not
transport or delivery services." App. Br. at 14. First, this Court generally does not consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and therefore, should refuse to consider this
argument now. Watkins Co., LLC v. Estate of Storms, 161 Idaho 683, 685, 390 P.3d 409, 411
(2017).
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Second, and more importantly, even if the Court does reach this argument, the "F.O.B.
Delivered" term of the prime contract between Brown Strauss and TRC actually illustrates just
how integral transportation and delivery was to the deal reached between Bro\\TI Strauss and
TRC. The "F.O.B." language in an agreement such as the prime contract between TRC and
Brown Strauss defines whether a contract is a "shipment" contract or "destination" contract.
Notably, both "shipment" and "destination" contracts envision a delivery component, with the
difference being the specified location for said delivery. Indeed, "F.O.B." itself is a "delivery
term," and both "shipment" and "destination" contracts are contracts that require or authorize
the seller to "ship the goods by carrier." Idaho Code§ 28-2-319(1) ("Unless otherwise agreed
the term F.O.B. (which means 'free on board') at a named place, even though used only in
connection with the stated price, is a delivery term ... ") (emphasis added); Idaho Code§ 28-2509(1).
Under a "shipment" contract -- which is the default rule -- risk of loss transfers when the
seller delivers the goods to a carrier for delivery to a buyer. See Idaho Code§ 28-2-319(1)(a);
Idaho Code § 28-2-509(1)(a). By contrast, under a "destination" contract, risk of loss transfers
when the seller delivers the goods to the buyer's place of business, and the seller agrees to
transport the goods to buyer "at [seller's] own expense and risk." Idaho Code§ 28-2-319(1)(b)
(noting that "when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the seller must at his own expense
and risk transport the goods to that place and there tender delivery of them in the manner

provided in this chapter (section 28-2-503)") (emphasis added); Idaho Code Ann. § 28-2509(l)(b). A "destination" contract is created by use of language designating the buyer's place of
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business as the location for delivery.

Idaho Code § 28-2-319(l)(b); Idaho Code § 28-2-

509(l)(b); Deiter v. Coons, 162 Idaho 44, 49,394 P.3d 87, 92 (2017) (discussing "shipment" and
"destination" contracts); 77A C.J.S. SALES § 274 (same); Delivery under shipment and

destination contracts, generally, 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:10 (4th ed.) (same, also
noting that "whether the shipment is at the buyer's or the seller's expense, it is the seller's

responsibility to make all necessary arrangements ... ") (emphasis added).
Here, as the Kellys point out, the "F.0.B. delivered" language in the prime contract
between TRC and Brown Strauss is a classic example of a "destination" contract, because it
designated delivery to the buyer's place of business. However, contrary to the Kellys' argument,
the presence of the "F.0.B. Delivered" term actually cuts against the Kellys' position and

establishes that the delivery service Mr. Kelly was "hired" to perform was expressly contracted
for between Brown Strauss and TRC. This would be true even if the contract were deemed to be
a "shipment" contract, as all contracts using the term "F.O.B.," by definition, contain a delivery
services component. Stated another way, the very inclusion of an "F.0.B." term of any type, in
any contract, confirms that transportation and delivery services are a critical part of the bargained
for exchange between the contracting parties.'
Thus, the presence of an "F.O.B." delivery term in the contract between Brown Strauss
1

The fact that Brown Strauss subcontracted its shipping obligation to Jay Transport is of no
import, and has no bearing on whether, in the first instance, Brown Strauss contracted with TRC
for shipping, resulting in someone (here, Dale Kelly) being "hired" to perform the service of
delivery. This is evident in the Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P .3d 4 75
(2000) case discussed below, which involved services that had been subcontracted out by
Schilling to Allpress Logging.
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and TRC actually confinns the correctness of the district court's ruling that the
transportation/delivery "services" of Dale Kelly were "hired" by TRC within the meaning of
Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a), and therefore, that Dale Kelly was a category one statutory
employee of TRC under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law. It is perplexing for the Kellys
to suggest that TRC did not expressly contract for delivery, when the contract between Brown
Strauss and TRC contained an "F. O.B. " delivery term. It is the Kellys, not the district court, that
have misunderstood the meaning of an "F.O.B." tenn in a contract.
The Kellys also argue that the "goods" versus "services" distinction they assert is
supported by this Court's decisions in the cases of Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho
245, 108 P.3d 392 (2004) and Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 124 P.3d 996
(2005). Specifically, the Kellys argue that "Venters and Gonzalez establish that in cases brought
by truck drivers, category one statutory employer immunity is limited to those parties who
expressly enter into a contract for trucking services." App. Br. at 17.2 First, even if the Kellys'
characterization of the holding in these cases were correct, TRC did expressly enter into a
contract with Brown Strauss that expressly called for delivery of the purchased tubes. Second,
the Kellys have exaggerated the holdings in both Venters and Gonzalez, as there is no language

2

The Kellys characterize the contract between TRC and Brown Strauss as being "indirectly
related" to another contract for trucking services (i.e. the subcontract between Brown Strauss and
Jay Transport for shipping). Id. This, again, is confusing, because TRC expressly contracted for
shipping by the inclusion of an "F.O.B." delivery tenn in its contract with Brown Strauss. The
fact that Brown Strauss elected to subcontract out its delivery obligation to Jay Transport does
not change the fact that Brown Strauss had a contractual obligation to TRC to deliver the steel
tubes. The delivery was therefore not only directly related to the prime contract between TRC
and Brown Strauss, but was a critical component of that prime contract.
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in either case that would support the sweeping assertion that only those who enter into an express
contract for trucking services are entitled to category one statutory employer immunity. Notably,
both the Venters and Gonzalez decisions are similar to this case, because they involved truck
drivers who were injured while delivering loads while acting as independent contractors for a
principal.

In both cases, similarly to this case, the claimant was employed by a trucking

company who contracted with the statutory employer to deliver products for the benefit of the
statutory employer.

In Venters, Sorrento operated a cheese factory in Nampa, Idaho, which produced excess
wastewater. Venters, 141 Idaho at 247, 108 P.3d at 394. To offload this excess wastewater,
Sorrento paid local farmers an annual fee for the right to come unto the local farmers' property to
pump wastewater into large storage tanks owned and maintained on the farmers' land by
Sorrento. Id. As a collateral benefit to permitting Sorrento to deposit excess wastewater on their
respective properties, the local farmers were permitted to use the wastewater as an irrigation
source. Sorrento contracted with 3-C Trucking to haul the wastewater to Sorrento's storage tanks
maintained on the local farmers' properties. Id. Montierth Farms was one of the local farms that
contracted to "permit [Sorrento] to build a wastewater facility and to truck wastewater onto the
farm site for dispersal." Id. at 247-48, 394-95. Stanley Venters, while waiting in the staging area
at Montierth Farms to dump his load of wastewater, was struck, and eventually killed, by another
truck driver who had just dumped his wastewater load. Id. at 248, 395. After receiving workers'
compensation benefits, Mr. Venters' heirs filed a purported third-party claim against Montierth
Farms and Sorrento.

Id.

Both Montierth Farms and Sorrento filed motions for summary
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judgment arguing (among other things in the case of Montierth Farms) the same statutory
employer immunity at issue here. Id. Both motions were granted by the district court. Id.
Venters' heirs appealed. Id.
Though this Court affirmed on appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Montierth Farms, it did not do so on grounds of statutory employer immunity. Relevant here, the
Court found that Montierth Farms was not a category one statutory employer of Mr. Venters,
because "Montierth lacked even an indirect contractual employment relationship with Mr.
Venters." Id. at 249, 396. After noting this, the Kellys argue that there are parallels between

Venters and the instant matter, and in an effort to create parallels between the instant case and
Venters, take liberties with the facts of Venters, such as by suggesting the existence of transfer of
title terms that are simply not addressed at all in Venters -- and that would have been out of place
in Venters -- because Venters did not deal at all with a contract for the sale of goods with a
delivery component.
Contrary to the Kellys' argument that the instant matter exactly parallels Venters, this
case is actually distinguishable from Venters, at least to the extent the Kellys argue that TRC
stands in the same shoes as Montierth Farms from Venters. First, Venters clearly did not involve
a traditional contract for the purchase and delivery of goods to Montierth. Indeed, the clear
purpose of the Sorrento wastewater contracts was not about the sale of the wastewater as a good
to Montierth, but was instead, about finding a place for Sorrento to dispose of its excess
wastewater. This is reflected by the fact that local farmers like Montierth Farms did not pay
Sorrento to purchase wastewater, but that instead, Sorrento paid local farmers for the right to
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construct wastewater tanks and dispose of wastewater on the local farmers' property. Thus, the
wastewater in Venters was delivered pursuant to a contract for the primary benefit of Sorrento,
and the metal tubes in this case were delivered pursuant to a contract for the primary benefit of
TRC. If an analogy of this case even can be made to the specific facts of Venters, TRC stands in

similar shoes to Sorrento (who was deemed to be entitled to statutory employer immunity on
appeal), not Montierth Farms.
Second, and more importantly, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that an "indirect
contractual employment relationship" did exist here between TRC and Dale Kelly, because the
prime contract between TRC and Brown Strauss expressly included a delivery component as one
of its terms. An analogous "destination" contract delivery term such as the one at issue here
(e.g., F.O.B. delivered) was not discussed by the Court in Venters. Frankly, it is inconceivable
that an analogous provision would have been present in the contract at issue in Venters, because
the contract between Montierth Farms and Sorrento was not for the purchase and delivery to
Montierth Farms of Sorrento's wastewater.
Similarly, the Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 124 P.3d 996 (2005) case
does not stand for the expansive proposition it was cited for by the Kellys. In Gonzalez, Lamb
Weston contracted with P.S.I. Waste Systems to haul non-recyclable waste from its food
packaging plant to a transfer station. Id. at 121, 997. Cecilio Gonzalez, a P.S.I. employee, was
injured while attempting to unload the Lamb Weston waste at a transfer station. Id.

Mr.

Gonzalez filed suit against Lamb Weston. Id. Lamb Weston moved for partial summary
judgment on the grounds that is was Mr. Gonzalez statutory employer. Id. The district court
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granted the motion. Id. This Court affirmed, following the non-controversial precedent that as an
upstream contractor of a subcontractor's employee, Lamb Weston was Mr. Gonzalez's statutory
employer. Id. at 122, 998. The Kellys argue that Gonzalez stands for the proposition that an
express contract for "hauling services" is necessary for statutory employer immunity to apply.
However, though Gonzalez involved a contract that required P.S.I. to haul food waste, there is no
limiting language in Gonzalez that suggests such a contract of that nature is required for
statutory immunity to apply, or that a different type of contract also resulting in a worker being
"hired" to perform a service would somehow be outside the scope of the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Law. Instead, because the prime contract in the instant matter included a term for
delivery, and because Kelly, like Mr. Gonzalez, was an employee of a downstream
subcontractor, Gonzalez actually illustrates the correctness of the district court's ruling.
Under the plain language of Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a), the question for Worker's
Compensation purposes is not whether a contract is predominantly "for goods" or predominantly
"for services" as it is under the UCC's predominant factor test (discussed more fully below), but
instead, whether the contract (however characterized) resulted in someone being "expressly or
impliedly hired" to perform a "service." Stated differently, there is no exemption in the text of
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act for "services" provided pursuant to a contract that may
have been primarily motivated by the purchase of goods, but that also contained a services
component. As was well-put by the district court, "[t]he Act does not confine its definition of
employer to those who hired or contracted predominantly (or exclusively) for services." R., p.
204.
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Applied here, and as the district court correctly found, Dale Kelly was unquestionably
"hired" to perform the contracted-for "service" of delivery pursuant to the prime contract
between Brown Strauss and TRC. That would be true even if the prime contract were deemed to
be primarily motivated by the purchase of goods.

The district court therefore correctly

concluded that the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law applies, that TRC was Dale Kelly's
statutory employer, and that TRC was entitled to category one statutory employer immunity
under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law.
C.

The district court properly relied on Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc. in reaching its
decision.

The Kellys next argue that the district court erred in relying on this Court's opinion in the
Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000). Specifically, the Kellys

argue that Spencer is "readily distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts of the instant appeal."
App. Br. at 18. Contrary to the Kellys' argument, Spencer serves as perhaps the best example of
the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law's application to a contract with both a "goods" and
"services" component, and is significant authority supporting the correctness of the district
court's decision in this case.
In Spencer, the contract between Schilling and Weyerhaeuser provided that
Weyerhaeuser would advance Schilling $100,000 in purchase money, and in return
Weyerhaeuser would have the right to cut and remove timber from Schilling's property.
Spencer, 134 Idaho at 857, 11 P.3d at 476. The contract provided that when Schilling delivered

timber to Weyerhaeuser, a portion of the contract price would be used to reduce the balance of
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the advance and a portion would be allocated to cover the cost of harvesting the timber. Id. In
other words, the contract was a hybrid contract with both a "goods" and "services" component.
Weyerhaeuser purchased both a good (the timber) and a service (the cutting of the timber).
To satisfy the services component of the contract with Weyerhaeuser, Schilling
subcontracted with Allpress Logging to cut and deliver the timber to Weyerhaeuser. Id. at 477.
There is no indication in Spencer that there was any direct contract between Weyerhaeuser and
Allpress Logging. Instead, "Allpress hired, instructed and paid his own employees without any
involvement" from Schilling or Weyerhaeuser. Id. On all but two occasions, checks were issued
from Weyerhaeuser directly to Schilling who deposited them into his personal account. Schilling
would then pay Allpress out of this account. Id. While cutting timber, an Allpress employee,
Justin Spencer, was severely injured when the line machine he was operating tipped over on top
of him. Id. At the time of the accident, neither All press nor Schilling had worker's compensation
coverage for Spencer. Id.
Spencer filed a worker's compensation complaint, and the Industrial Commission found,
among other things, that Weyerhaeuser was Spencer's statutory employer - notwithstanding that
the contract at issue involved a sale of goods (timber).

In fact, a dissenting Commissioner

unsuccessfully argued, as the Kellys do here, "that the Idaho Code should not be interpreted as
being so broad as to include Weyerhaeuser simply because it purchased raw materials from
Schilling." Id. at 478. Though the Spencer Court determined that "the contract under which
Schilling and Weyerhaeuser were operating was a timber sale contract[,]" the Court still found
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that the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law applied, and affirmed that Weyerhaeuser was
Spencer's statutory employer. Id. The Court noted:
Weyerhaeuser contracted with Schilling for the purchase of the timber, and
Weyerhaeuser contracted to pay Schilling for the price of harvesting. In their
agreement, part of the value of each load delivered was paid against Schilling's
$100,000 advance, but part of the price was also included as part of the cost for
delivery. While Weyerhaeuser did not care who did the harvesting, it paid the
costs of logging the pine. Thus, Weyerhaeuser was contracting with Schilling for
logging the pine on the property.
Spencer, 134 Idaho at 861, 11 P.3d at 480 (emphasis added). The same is true here. Just as

Weyerhaeuser contracted for the service of logging in connection with its purchase of timber,
TRC contracted for the service of delivery of the steel tubes in connection with its purchase of
steel tubes. Just as Weyerhaeuser did not care who actually cut the timber, TRC did not care
who delivered the steel tubes it purchased from Brown Strauss. However, both Weyerhaeuser
and TRC contracted for a service connected with the goods they purchased, which was
subcontracted out in each case -- in Spencer to Allpress (Spencer's employers) and here, to Dale
Kelly Trucking (Dale Kelly's employer). On those facts, the Court correctly found in Spencer
that Weyerhaeuser was Spencer's statutory employer, and comparatively, the district court
correctly found here that TRC was Dale Kelly's statutory employer.
The Kellys rely on insignificant distinctions in attempting to distinguish Spencer from the
present case, such as the fact that Weyerhaeuser bore the risk of loss, and that a portion of the
price paid in Spencer was expressly allocated to logging services. For purposes of evaluating the
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3

application of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, these distinctions are ofno moment. The
question, instead, is whether a worker was "expressly or impliedly hired" to perform a service.
Spencer is a clear example of a case where the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law was deemed

to apply to a hybrid contract with both a goods and services component, and that is exactly what
is present here. Therefore, contrary to the Kellys' arguments, the district court properly relied on
the case of Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000), among other
cases, in concluding that TRC was Dale Kelly's statutory employer.

D.

The Court should decline the Kellys' invitation to carve out an exception to the Act;
namely, that a purchaser of goods cannot, as a matter of law, be a statutory
employer of a delivery driver.
Next, the Kellys argue that this Court should determine, presumably as a matter of law,

that a "purchaser of goods" cannot be a statutory employer of a "delivery person." Specifically,
the Kellys argue that even if the Court were to conclude (as it should) that the contract between
TRC and Brown Strauss was subject to the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, the Court should
carve out a special exception and hold that the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law does not
apply to purchasers of goods and the delivery drivers delivering those goods. App. Br. at 21.

4

In

3

TRC, through the F.O.B. term in the prime contract with Brown Strauss, plainly contracted for
delivery whether or not any portion of the purchase price was expressly allocated to delivery.
Delivery was therefore part of the bargained for exchange. Because delivery was contracted for,
the consideration paid by TRC was, logically, for both the tubes and delivery. To say that TRC
did not pay for delivery in the purchase price because there was no express price allocation to
delivery also ignores the business reality that Brown Strauss was not, out of the goodness of its
heart, bearing the cost of delivery of the tubes to Idaho Falls, Idaho.
4

As a threshold matter, the Spencer case discussed above rebuts the notion that a purchaser of
goods can never be a statutory employer, because, again, Spencer held that the Idaho Worker's
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making this argument, the Kellys rely - as they did below - entirely on authority from outside of
Idaho. The out-of-jurisdiction cases relied on by the Kellys in support of their goods/services
argument are not only not binding, but also deal with distinct worker's compensation laws in
other states and are also factually distinguishable and unpersuasive.

As the district court

correctly found, "[b]ecause pertinent Idaho case law exists which allows this Court to resolve the
issue before it, this Court does not look to other jurisdictions to interpret the meaning of statutory
employer under Idaho law."

If this Court does consider the out-of-state authority cited by the Kellys, as a threshold
matter, the definition of a statutory employer in Idaho appears to be much broader than it is in
the states cited by the Kellys. Compare, Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 849, 203 P.3d 1246,
1248 (2009) ("[A] statutory employer [is] anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting out
services, is liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not pay
those benefits.") with McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Mo. 2009)
(noting that "[o]ne is a statutory employee if (1) the work is performed pursuant to a contract, (2)
the injury occurs on or about the premises of the alleged statutory employer and (3) the work is

in the usual course of the alleged statutory employer's business.") (emphasis added).
In any event, these out-of-state cases are distinguishable - if not entirely inapposite to
this case - because they do not focus on the definition of "employer" under the respective

Compensation Law did apply in a case that involved a contract for the sale of goods (timber)
with a separate services component. Under Spencer, and as held by the district court, the law in
Idaho appears to be that a contract for the sale of goods can be covered under the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Law so long as it has a services component.
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workers' compensation statutes at issue in these cases. Instead, the cases cited by the Kellys deal
with the definition of "contractor," appear to be applying a category two statutory employer
analysis, or both. See e.g., Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
(discussing Kentucky law defining "contractor" as a "person who contracts with another ... [t]o
have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the work of the trade,
business, occupation, or profession of such person" and determining that Ford was not a
contractor under that definition); Meyer v. Piggly Wiggly No. 24, Inc., 338 S.C. 471, 474, 527
S.E.2d 761, 763 (2000) (ostensibly applying a category two analysis and determining that a
vendor-vendee relationship does not render one a "contractor" and that "a vendor's employee is
not the purchaser's statutory employee because the vendor does not perform part of the
purchaser's business."); Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 Va. 42, 44,471 S.E.2d 473, 47475 (1996) (ostensibly applying a category two analysis and determining that "an employee of a
company supplying materials is not engaged in the trade,. business, or occupation of the general
contractor when the employee is injured while delivering the materials to the job site."); lvfobley
v. Flowers, 211 Ga. App. 761,761,440 S.E.2d 473, 474--75 (1994) (noting that "[i]n order to
make a party to the contract for the sale of goods such a 'contractor,' the contract to sell must be
accompanied by an undertaking ... to render substantial service in connection with the goods
sold."); Gray Bldg. Sys. v. Trine, 260 Ga. 252, 252, 391 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1990) (same); Shipley
v. Gipson, 773 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. App. 1989), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection,
121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (noting that "only a contract
which delegates to another the performance of the usual operations of the employer's business
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comes within the meaning of the statute."); Wilson v. Daniel Int'! Corp,, 260 S.C. 548, 554, 197
S.E.2d 686, 689 (1973) (noting category two "trade, business or occupation" requirement);

Hacker v. Brookover Feed Yard, Inc., 202 Kan. 582,586,451 P.2d 506, 511 (1969) (performing
category two analysis and concluding that "[ a] sale and delivery of merchandise is not such a
contractual relationship as is anticipated by K.S.A. 44-503 creating statutory employers and
employees for the purpose of workmen's compensation."'); Doyle v. },1issouri Val. Constructors,

Inc., 288 F. Supp. 121, 123, fn. 1 (D. Colo. 1968) (noting that statutory employer immunity in
Colorado applied only where the claimant was "performing work which would ordinarily be
accomplished through the defendant's employees, as required by Colorado decisional law[,]"
(e.g. Category Two)); Garrett v. Tubular Prod., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Va. 1959)
(while not entirely clear from the opinion whether the Eastern District of Virginia is applying
something akin to a category one or category two analysis, it is clear that the opinion turned on a
vendor/supplier vs. subcontractor distinction).
The Kellys also argue that Ferguson v. Air-Hydraulics Co., 492 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App.
1973) is "very similar to this case." App. Br., p. 24. The Kellys also cite McCracken v. Wal-

Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. 2009) in support of their position. Id. at p. 25.
However, both the Ferguson and McCracken Courts also employed something akin to Idaho's
category two statutory employer analysis, and therefore, are inapposite to the category one
statutory employer question now before the Court on appeal. See McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores

E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Mo. 2009) (noting that "[o]ne is a statutory employee if (1) the
work is performed pursuant to a contract, (2) the injury occurs on or about the premises of the
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alleged statutory employer and (3) the work is in the usual course of the alleged statutory

employer's business.") (emphasis added); Ferguson v. Air-Hydraulics Co., 492 S.W.2d 130, 135
(Mo. App. 1973), abrogated by McGuire v. Tenneco, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1988) (noting
that "[u]nder the above statute our courts have held that there are three essential elements which
must be present before an employee can be held to be a statutory employee. The evidence must
show that: (1) the work was performed under a contract; (2) the injury must have occurred on or
about the premises of the employer; and (3) the injury must have occurred while the employee

was doing work in the usual course of the business of the employer.") (emphasis added). TRC is
unclear how two out-of-state cases decided under Missouri's equivalent ofldaho's category two
statutory employer framework have any bearing whatsoever on the present case.
At most, the out-of-state case law that finds a goods/services distinction meaningful in
the statutory employer context looks to whether the purchase of goods was accompanied by
"substantial services." See e.g., Bros. v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 217 Ark. 632, 638, 232
S.W.2d 646, 650 (1950) ("We do not hold that a mere contract for the sale of goods makes either
the buyer or seller, or both, a 'contractor' within the meaning of section ·6, but we are committed

to the view that when the contract to sell is accompanied by an undertaking by either party to
render substantial services in connection with the goods sold, that party is a 'contractor' within
the meaning of the section.") (emphasis added); Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784,
788 (W.D. Ky. 2003) ("There appears to be two notable exceptions to this general rule: (1) when
the contract to sell is accompanied by an undertaking by either party to render substantial
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services in connection with goods sold; or (2) when the transaction is a mere devise or subterfuge
to avoid liability.").
In Hall v. 84 Lumber Co,, No. CV409-057, 2011 WL 13279174, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4,
2011 ), the Southern District of Georgia noted:
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that "[a] mere contract for the sale
of goods does not make either the buyer or seller or both a 'contractor' as used in
[O.C.G.A.] § 34-9-8." Gray Bldg. Sys. v. Trine, 260 Ga. 252, 253, 391 S.E.2d
764, 765 (1990). However, a party can be a statutory employer if the contract is
"accompanied by an undertaking by either party to render substantial services in
connection with the goods sold. " Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, Defendant 84
Lumber qualifies as a statutory employer if the delivery of the materials to its
customers is a substantial service.
After reviewing the applicable case law in Georgia, the Court concludes that the
delivery of the goods was a substantial service, making Defendant 84 Lumber a
statutory employer with tort immunity.
Hall v. 84 Lumber Co., No. CV409-057, 2011 WL 13279174, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2011)

(emphasis added). While the Hall Court dealt with a different set of facts, it's finding that
delivery was "a substantial service" in connection with the purchase of goods is equally
applicable to TRC here. In sum, even if the goods/services distinction mattered at every level of
the contractual chain (which under existing Idaho law, it does not), the delivery of the steel tubes
was a "substantial service" performed in connection with the purchase of the steel tubes.
Therefore, even if the case law cited by the Kellys were applicable here, the principal contract at
issue - even if deemed to be predominantly for the purchase of goods - was accompanied by the
"substantial service" of delivery, the cost of which amounted to about 7% of the total invoice
amount. R., at p. 87.
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Finally, the Kellys return again to the same "house of horrors" argument that they made
unsuccessfully to the district court. The Kellys attempt to turn the "grand bargain" on its head by
resorting to an example of a purchaser of small consumer goods being held liable for worker's
compensation benefits for UPS delivery drivers. However, the Kellys' projected sea change in
the way people do business, is, as a practical matter, very unlikely to occur. The reality is that
most companies (especially large companies like UPS used in the Kellys' example) provide
workers' compensation insurance for their employees. This reality is in all likelihood the result
of the very purpose of the statutory employer doctrine, and the pressure contractors have placed
on the parties they do business with to purchase worker's compensation coverage. However, in
the rare circumstance where that is not the case, the Idaho legislature has already made the policy
choice that ABC, Inc., might -- in Plaintiffs' far-fetched and unlikely example -- be liable as a
statutory employer if all upstream contractors failed to secure worker's compensation coverage
for the injured driver making the delivery to ABC, Inc. Indeed, this is one of the lynchpin
principles of the statutory employer doctrine. Adam v. Titan Equip. Supply Corp., 93 Idaho 644,
647,470 P.2d 409,412 (1970) ("Undoubtedly one objective of the statute in making the operator
of the business liable for workmen's compensation, was to afford full protection to workmen by
preventing the operator or contractor avoiding liability under the workmen's compensation act by
subcontracting work to others who might be irresponsible.").
Alternatively, the district court wisely pointed out that the facts of the instant case are
readily distinguishable from the Kellys' hypothetical. R., p. 207. Specifically, the district court
noted that the present case involves a specially-arranged delivery of 43,000 pounds of steel
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tubing rather than the delivery of a small consumer good in the Kellys' hypothetical that can be
easily assimilated into stream-of-commerce delivery systems (such as UPS and other like
providers).

Id.

Given the stark factual differences between this case and the Kellys'

hypothetical, it may well be reasonable for a court to find that no statutory employer relationship
exists in the Kellys' hypothetical scenario, even though such a relationship clearly exists here
under existing Idaho law.
E.

The Court should reject the Kellys' invitation to import UCC Article 2's
Predominant Factor Test to the Workers' Compensation context.

Lastly, the Kellys argue that this Court should adopt, as a matter of first impression, UCC
Article 2' s predominant factor test in evaluating whether a contract is one in which "services"
are provided within the meaning of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law. TRC agrees with
the Kellys that the predominant factor test is used by Idaho courts in resolving whether a hybrid
contract (those contracts that involve both a goods component and a services component) is a
"contract for the sale of goods" governed by Article 2 of the UCC, or a "contract for services"
not governed by the UCC. "The test for whether a hybrid contract is subject to the UCC is
whether the predominant factor, the thrust, the purpose of the agreement is a transaction of sale,
with labor incidentally involved." Silicon Int'/ Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 546,
314 P.3d 593, 601 (2013) (citations omitted). But that does not mean there is good reason to
extend that test to the unrelated context of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law.
Notably, none of the reported Idaho cases discussing statutory employer immunity adopt
the predominant factor test. Moreover, TRC is unaware of any reported case in any jurisdiction
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(aside from the Schuler case discussed below) adopting or extending the "predominant factor"
test to the worker's compensation context, let alone a case that adopts any sort of extra-statutory
requirement that every contract in the contractual chain be predominantly for services for
statutory employer to apply.

Again, there is nothing in the text of the Idaho Worker's

Compensation Law that would preclude statutory employer immunity from applying to a hybrid
contract, there is no defined exemption from the application of the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Law if a contract is a hybrid contract, and no language in the Law's text from
which such an intent could be inferred.
The Kellys do not dispute that the lone example of a case in any jurisdiction that has
adopted the predominant factor test in the context of a workers' compensation claim is the
decision of Judge Candy W. Dale in the case of Schuler v. Batte lie Energy All., LLC, No. 4: l 8CV-00234-CWD, 2019 WL 2477609 (D. Idaho June 12, 2019).

It is noteworthy that the

Plaintiff in the Schuler case is represented by the same firm representing the Kellys in this
matter, and also that then-defense counsel for Battle Energy Alliance in Schuler did not argue
against or oppose the application of the UCC's predominant factor test to the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Law. 5 However, the Schuler matter is still very much pending, and in any event,
in Schuler, Judge Dale found that even under the UCC's predominant factor test, the contract
under which the truck driver made delivery of in-pile tubes to the Department of Energy's

5

Counsel of record for TRC in this matter have since substituted in as counsel of record for
Battelle Energy Alliance in the Schuler case. This information is provided solely to inform this
Court that this is a familiar, hotly-litigated issue for both sets of counsel of record in this appeal.
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Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex was predominantly for services, Id. at *8 ("Considering
the contract as a whole, although the predominant factor of Purchase Order No. 3015656 is the
provision of ten IPTs, the predominant factor of the Requirements Document, which the
purchase order expressly incorporates, is the provision of GE Hitachi's services during the IPT
manufacturing process."), It was on other grounds - namely, a finding that Battelle was not
Schuler's statutory employer -- that Judge Dale denied Battelle's motion for summary
. dgment. 6
JU

In addition to the adoption of the predominant factor test being virtually unprecedented
nationwide in the worker's compensation context, it is a poor fit in the worker's compensation
context. Indeed, imagine the same facts of this case with one minor wrinkle - that neither Dale
Kelly Trucking nor any of the upstream contractors of Dale Kelly save TRC had secured
worker's compensation coverage for their employees.

Would it be good public policy,

particularly given that Dale Kelly was unquestionably "impliedly hired" by TRC to perform the
service of transportation/delivery of the tubes, to allow TRC to avoid payment of worker's
compensation benefits to Dale Kelly on the technical grounds that the "predominant factor" in
TRC's upstream contract with Brown Strauss was primarily the purchase of steel tubes, not the
transportation and delivery services expressly required by that contract and that Dale Kelly was
"impliedly hired" to perform? It does not take much imagination to realize that if Dale Kelly had

not obtained worker's compensation coverage through Dale Kelly Trucking or any other
6

It is also noteworthy that Judge Dale's opinion in that case was reached prior to this Court's
decision in Richardson v.Z&H Construction et.al,.Docket Number 46587, March 20,2020.
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upstream contractor, that at least Dale Kelly's answer to this question would be "no," and that he
would have -- just as the injured worker successfully did in the Spencer case discussed above -sought recovery of worker's compensation benefits from TRC under the statutory employer
doctrine.
However, in such a scenario, under the Kellys' proposed "predominant factor" test
approach, Mr. Kelly's right to what otherwise would have been "sure and certain" relief under
the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law would be clouded and would require the injured worker
to incur significant legal fees and costs to obtain a determination of his or her rights, which
would ultimately come down to the Idaho Industrial Commission's or a court's determination of
the predominant factors/motivations of upstream contractors in entering into contracts.

If the

Commission or court determined that any contract in the chain of contractors and subcontractors
was predominantly for the purchase of goods, the injured worker would be completely deprived
of any relief under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law.
Idaho worker's rights to "sure and certain" relief under the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Law should not be compromised and overcomplicated - e.g. made unsure and
uncertain - by the adoption of the UCC's "predominant factor" test in the worker's
compensation context.

In resolving this issue, it cannot be overlooked that adopting the

"predominant factor" test and applying it to every contract in the chain would not only
undermine and cloud upstream contractors' rights to immunity, but would, as a corollary, also
cloud and undermine the important "sure and certain" relief that the statutory employer doctrine
was intended to provide to Idaho's workers.
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There is nothing in the text of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law that suggests that
an injured worker's "sure and certain" relief - or, as a corollary, an employer's immunity should be dependent on whether any contract in the contractual chain could be characterized as
being predominantly for the purchase of goods. Had the Legislature believed such qualification
was necessary, it would have written that condition into the Worker's Compensation Law. The
stakes are too high on all sides to inject such uncertainty into the well-settled "grand bargain"
that exists between Idaho's workers and their employers. TRC therefore respectfully requests
that this Court decline - as the district court did - the Kellys' invitation to adopt the UCC
predominant factor test in the workers' compensation context.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing argument, TRC respectfully requests that the Court affirm the
district court's Judgment.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2020.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
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